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Abstract. The proliferation of location-based social networks (LBSNs)
has provided the community with an abundant source of information
that can be exploited and used in many different ways. LBSNs offer a
number of conveniences to its participants, such as - but not limited to - a
list of places in the vicinity of a user, recommendations for an area never
explored before provided by other peers, tracking of friends, monetary
rewards in the form of special deals from the venues visited as well as a
cheap way of advertisement for the latter. However, service convenience
and security have followed disjoint paths in LBSNs and users can misuse
the offered features. The major threat for the service providers is that
of fake check-ins. Users can easily manipulate the localization module of
the underlying application and declare their presence in a counterfeit lo-
cation. The incentives for these behaviors can be both earning monetary
as well as virtual rewards. Therefore, while fake check-ins driven from
the former motive can cause monetary losses, those aiming in virtual re-
wards are also harmful. In particular, they can significantly degrade the
services offered from the LBSN providers (such as recommendations) or
third parties using these data (e.g., urban planners). In this paper, we
propose and analyze a honeypot venue-based solution, enhanced with a
challenge-response scheme, that flags users who are generating fake spa-
tial information. We believe that our work will stimulate further research
on this important topic and will provide new directions with regards to
possible solutions.
General Terms/Keywords: Location-based Social Networks, Fake check-
ins, Honeypots
1 Introduction
During the last couple of years, a new class of digital social networks, namely,
location-based social networks (LBSNs), have enjoyed rapid proliferation1. These
1 While we are mainly focusing and referring to location-based social networks in this
paper, our work is applicable to any location-based service regardless of the presence
of an explicit social network or not. However, the majority of these services integrate
a strong social component.
communities not only have interests in common, but they are also bounded with
regards to their geographic location (e.g., same city). Despite their recent deploy-
ment, these services have enjoyed large adoption. For instance, Foursquare just
one year after being launched had been valued by venture capitals at $100 million
[1]! Google is also upgrading it’s own LBSN (Google Latitude) enhancing it with
more features, while Facebook recently acquired Gowalla showing its interest to
create a competitive upgrade of its own location component, namely, Facebook
Places. Yelp as well has recently added a location component to each mobile ap-
plication, through which users can check-in to places, keeping up with the rest
location-based services. LBSNs offer a number of convenient features. For exam-
ple, every user can easily get information with regards to his geographic location
on demand. In addition, each user can track his friends, which can potentially
help him to explore new places. Recently, LBSNs launched recommendation en-
gines that aggregate all the information from all the users’ check-ins. Moreover,
as a recent case study has shown [2], the gaming aspects of these systems (e.g.,
earning points for visiting places) form an important motivation for people to
adopt their usage.
Furthermore, the geographical data that are generated for the users of these
mobile applications, can facilitate studies that span a huge spectrum of fields.
Human mobility, urban planning, epidimiology and spatial business planning are
just a few examples.
Nevertheless, this wide utilization of LBSNs is accompanied with security
threats from possible misuse of the systems. While there have been many user
concerns (e.g., [3]) and research (e.g., [4] [5]) related to privacy issues, in this
work we are considering another major risk in LBSNs, that of fake check-ins.
While it is only recently that it has received the required attention from the
research community, it is a legitimate concern and source of frustration for both
the users (e.g., [6]) as well as the providers (e.g., [7]).
1.1 Cheating Types and Their Effects
Similar to the different incentives of users to share their locations, there are also
different reasons why a user, say Bob, will report fraudulent whereabouts. There
are two major cheating types that we will briefly describe in the following; (i)
monetary cheaters and (ii) gamer cheaters.
Some location-based services, offer Groupon-like deals to its users [8]; dis-
counts are offered for check-ins to specific venues participating in such cam-
paigns. He et al. [9] have reported that the majority of the special offers (more
than 90%) in Foursquare - the major LBSN to date - require multiple check-ins
(e.g., X times) to the venue. In other words, if Bob wants to unlock this deal,
he needs to visit the locale X − 1 times before being able to liquidize it. Hence,
he is tempted to generate a number of fake check-ins in order to obtain the offer
faster and with less cost. We will call such cheaters,monetary cheaters in the
rest of this paper. Clearly, monetary cheaters can lead to revenue losses for the
establishements that offer this deal as we have shown in our recent work [10].
Furthermore, almost all LBSNs have integrated gamification techniques in
order to keep the attention of their users. For instance, in Foursquare a user is
able to earn points for every check-in, badges for a specific series of check-ins,
“mayorships” of venues when he has the most check-ins in the venue within the
last two months etc. [11]. Google Latitude has included a leaderboard as well
[12]. A large fraction of users view these virtual rewards as means to prove their
social status (e.g., more mayorships translate to a more outgoing, social person
etc.) [13] and hence form an important reason for them to continue using the
system. Nevertheless, this forms an additional incentive for Bob to fake his pres-
ence, that is, to check-in to places to simply earn more virtual rewards. We will
refer to such cheaters as gamer cheaters. While, with a first thought gamer
cheaters do not seem to cause any damage to the system, this is not actually
correct. In particular, LBSN providers make use of the aggregated check-in in-
formation across all users to provide services such as location recommendations
to their users [14]. The existence of many fake check-ins (regardless if they are
from monetary or gamer cheaters), will add noise in the input of the underly-
ing recommendation engines, and hence the offered service will be significantly
degraded. Furthermore, while it is not clear what is the exact effect of “noisy”
(i.e., fake) data on the interdisciplinary studies mentioned above, it should be
evident that erroneous information will lead to results that do not represented
the actual reality.
Our data crawled from Foursquare, indicate that only 162,147 of the 27,219,001
venues existing at the time of crawling, i.e., 0.6% of the total venues, offer spe-
cial deals to their customers. Combined with the fact that the majority of the
LBSNs do not currently support Groupon-like offers, renders the gamer cheaters
the biggest misbehaving threat and the central focus of our work.
Monetary and gamer cheating check-ins can be further classified in two cat-
egories with regards to the distance between the pretended to be in venue and
the actual location of the cheater (say Bob). In far away fake check-ins, Bob is
actually located much further (e.g., more than 2 miles) from the locale he checks
in, while in near by fake check-ins, he is located fairly close to, but not in, the
venue he declares. The notion of near and far is relevant to the accuracy of the
positioning technology used from the application. In other, words for far away
check-ins the distance between Bob and the fake location is much larger than
the localization error, while in near by fake check-ins this distance is within the
localization error.
In theory, the former type can be easily caught, by simply verifying that
the GPS coordinates reported from the mobile device correspond to that of the
corresponding venue. Actually, Foursquare has developed the cheater code [15]
in an effort to minimize fake spatial information, which among other operations,
performs this sanity check. The cheater code imposes additional rules on users’
check-in frequency and speed. Nevertheless, the open nature of the operating sys-
tems of the mobile devices, have emerged a number of applications that alter the
GPS coordinates that are passed to the corresponding application (e.g., “Fake
Location” for iPhone [16], “Fake GPS location” from Android [17] etc.). Such
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Fig. 1. Pictorial representation of the honeypot venues.
applications, render the above detection schemes not efficient. Since every fake
check-in can be successfully pretended as taking place near the corresponding
venue, only the near by check-ins are relevant for our study.
As it might be evident, fake check-in detection is crucial for the long-run
success of the LBSN paradigm. While location-proofs that have been proposed
in other contexts can be applied for verifying a check-in, there are various rea-
sons - which we will analyze in the following section - that render them a not
so attractive solution within the context of these mobile applications. In this
paper, we propose a novel approach for detecting location cheaters in LBSNs.
Our proposed solution is mainly based on the primitives of honeypots. In brief,
the location-based service provider can create a number of well-targeted (not ex-
isting) honeypot venues (HV), which are attractive to the cheaters (e.g., easy to
obtain mayorship). Honest users are not expected to check-in to these HVs and
hence, whoever check-ins is flagged as a potential cheater. HVs are extremely
efficient with gamer cheaters. However, they might not perform as well with mon-
etary cheaters as explained later. Even though the latter represent an extremely
small percentage of misbehaving users, we enhance our initial HV scheme with
a challenge-response mechanism tailored to monetary cheaters.
Scope of our work: Gamification of the World Wide Web and mobile
applications is being increasingly used to engage users [18]. For instance, Q&A
social networks (e.g., Yahoo! Answers, Quora.com etc.) form their own game,
which of course can be manipulated by users who simply want to “win” the
game. Hence, gaming cheaters will be present and relevant in a variety of settings.
However, this will increase the amount of non useful information present in these
systems and invevitably reduce their credibility and appeal. Our framework,
while presented in this paper with a focus on location-based services, it can
form the basis for cheating detection schemes in other domains with appropriate
modifications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes work related
with location verification. In Section 3 we present and analyze our cheating
detection scheme, while Section 4 concludes our work.
2 Related studies
In this section we briefly discuss related with our work studies. In particular, we
survey literature on location proofs and secure localization.
Location proofs: With the increased importance of spatial information
for various applications, location-proofs have gained attention in the research
community during the last years. Saroiu and Wolman [19] define location proofs
as “a piece of data that certifies a device to a geographical location”. While there
are many ways proposed in the literature to generate these meta-data, in general
location proofs are based on cryptographic primitives and are issued by trusted
infrastructure (e.g., WiFi APs in combination with a trusted third party).
For instance, Denning and MacDoran [20] describe a location-based authenti-
cation system where the position at any time is uniquely identified by a location
signature. The signature is created by a location signature sensor (LSS) and it
is time varying, hence, making it difficult to be forged. However, this system
relies on a dedicated hardware and requires auxiliary equipment to strengthen
the weak GPS signal in indoor environment. Saroiu and Wolman [19] design a
scheme where location proofs are handed out by WiFi access points. Each mo-
bile device signs the APs’ beacons and send them back to APs. The latter upon
reception of the signed beacon creates a location signature for the mobile user.
Zhang et al. [21] aslo utilize WiFi infrastructure and design a power modulated
challenge-response location verification system. This mechanism utilizes RF sig-
nal strength from multiple APs to verify whether the claimed location is within
the overlapping range of neighboring APs. Luo and Hengartner [22], after pre-
senting six essential goals that a location proof system should follow, propose a
scheme, which is based on cryptographic hashes and WiFi APs. The proposed
system, is able to also retain the user’s privacy.
While the above schemes have not been designed with LBSNs in mind, they
can be tweaked in order to be applicable in this context. Recently, we have de-
signed a prototype fake check-in detection scheme, based on the primitives of
location proofs [10]. In brief, we utilize the notion of location signature using
WiFi infrastructure enhancing it with the notion of flocks for identifying users
that are not at the location and time they claim to be at. However, there are
some important limitations on the integration of location proof-based solutions
with LBSNs. In particular, such schemes rely on the existence of third-party
(trusted) infrastructure that can distribute and/or verify the location proofs.
The cost for deploying this infrastructure is not trivial. Furthermore, location
proofs are often based on the received signal strength at the mobile device. How-
ever, different hardware have different capabilities with respect to the accuracy of
these measurements and this can significantly affect the performance of the sys-
tem. Finally, the fact that wireless signals are not geo-fenced, make it extremely
hard to distinguished location proofs issued to a mobile device very close to, but
not in, the venue claimed. Hence, we are interested in a detection scheme that (i)
does not rely on third-party infrastructure and (ii) its performance is not tight
to the hardware of the mobile device and the distance between the latter and
the venue.
Secure localization: Secure localization has been extensively studied within
the context of wireless sensor networks. Nevertheless, there are studies that ap-
ply the same principles to tag user-generated content with spatial timestamps
that verify their location. For example, Lenders et al. [23] propose a combi-
nation of secure localization with a certification service in order to assign a
level of trust on the geo-tagged user content, while preserving privacy. Capkun
and Hubaux [24] propose verifiable multilateration, which is based on distance
bounding. In brief, the position of a device is infered based on its distance from
a set of known location reference points (at least three). Other approaches be-
longing to this category (e.g., [25] [26] [27]) exhibit drawbacks similar to that
of location-proofs. In particular, requirements such as dedicated infrastructure
(e.g., reference points) or reliance on the cooperation with telecom providers
(e.g., localization through cellular base station) makes these schemes prohibitive
for deployment with location-based services at the immediate future.
In the following section we propose a novel fake check-in detection scheme,
borrowing ideas from the traditional computer security field - and in particular
the fundamendals of honeypots. The proposed system satisfies both of the above
design requirements.
3 Our Proposed Scheme
In this section, we will present our proposed system for identifying possible cheat-
ing users. We would like to emphasize on the fact that this scheme is mainly
designed as a filtering mechanism, flagging users with high or low levels of sus-
picious behavior. To reiterate, our main focus is gamer cheaters. However, we
adjust the proposed HV scheme for dealing with monetary cheaters as well.
Our scheme in a nutshell: In brief, gamer cheaters are attracted by
venues that can facilitate their goal for as many as possible virtual rewards. In
other words, they do not care for the specifics of the venues as long as the latter
satisfy their goals. Hence, the LBSN service provider can create fake venues -
the honeypots - that appear attractive to gamer cheaters (e.g., for the case of
Foursquare a possible honeypot venue is one that appears to be easy to obtain
its “mayorship”). Given that under honest use of the system no one should be
present in that locale, users that check-in to honeypot venues are automatically
flagged as (potential) gamer cheaters.
On the contrary, monetary cheaters are clearly attracted by venues that offer
special deals. While, the service provider could create fake venues with special
offers, this might not be attract the majority monetary cheaters. The latter are
interested in real world rewards and thus, they are most probably focused to
venues they are already aware of. Therefore, on top of the HV mechanism, we
propose to integrate a challenge-response scheme during the check-in process.
This can verify with high probability the actual presence of the person in the
locale. Challenges will be isseued only to venues with special offers, to keep the
overhead on the check-in process minimal.
3.1 Honeypot Venues VS Gamer Cheaters
In computer security, honeypot refers to a machine that appears to be part
of the local network and exhibits known and obvious vulnerabilities, which an
attacker could exploit to penetrate in the network. Nevertheless, this machine is
in reality isolated from the rest of the network and monitored from the network
administrator. Honeypot machines are deployed to detect any malicious attempts
to hack into the network and to obtain passive information for the practises of
the attackers [28].
We are utilizing the same idea for trapping (gamer) cheating LBSN users.
Figure 1 visually presents our system. Bob, interested in obtaining as many
points as possible, obtains a list of venues from the system. In this specific
example, Bob is awarded with 1 point for every check-in to an already “visited”
venue, and 3 points for every check-in to a new place. Since the blue and the green
venues appear in Bob’s check-in history, they offer less points for checking-in as
compared to the red honeypot venue, which is new to him2.
In general the design of the HV should be such that maximizes the check-in
probability PHV of a cheater at venue HV. A simple behavioral model for this
probability could be the following. Let us consider C to be the set of appearling
features for a gamer cheater. For simplicity let us consider two representative
features drawn from the Foursquare paradigm; the number of possible points n
earned from the check-in and the probability m of becoming the “mayor” of the
venue, i.e., C = {n,m}. Then the probability p should be thought as a function
of the elements of C:
PHV = f(C) = f(n,m) (1)
In the case considered, the function f should clearly be a non-decreasing
function with respect to both variables n and m. Of course, the exact shape of
f is not known, but it can be reinforced by observing the behavior of identified
cheaters. This constant feedback process, will facilitate the design of more effec-
tive HVs and is graphically depicted in Figure 2. As we can see the behavioral
model f , and as a consequence the deployed HVs, is regularly refined through
analyzing the behavioral data of already identified cheaters.
Let us further explain the above through a simple example and assume that
our initial model is linear. The initial model f further assigns equal importance
to characteristics n and m for the decision of a cheater to perform a check-in. In
other words, assuming k total possible venues to check-in, the probability that
a cheater checks-in to venue i is given by:
pi =
α · ni + β ·mi∑k
j=1
α · nj + β ·mj
(2)
2 Of course the details of the virtual rewards are different for different systems, but
HVs can always be created with the principle of being more appealing to gamer
cheaters as compared to real locales.
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Fig. 2. Reiforcement learning of model f .
where α = β = 0.5. Therefore, the overall probability pc that a cheater checks-in
a HV is given by:
pc =
∑
i∈H
pi (3)
where H is the set of HVs.
After designing the HVs based on this model, we will eventually identify a
number of cheaters, say, Bob, Eve and Jack. By analyzing their check-in his-
tory, we can refine Equation 2. For instance, the data might show that “may-
orships” are more important and hence it should be β > α, or that cheaters
prefer checking-in to expensive restaurants (e.g., in order to be associated with
a “higher social status”). The latter would change the set C by adding as a new
element the type g of the HV (C = {n,m, g}).
An extreme case arises when C = ∅. This means that gamer cheaters do not
pay attention to specific features of the venues, but they just blindly check-in to
places at random. In this case, if there are λ HVs and φ real venues, we get:
pc =
λ
λ+ φ
(4)
The same holds true, when all venues around the misbehaving user are equally
appealing, i.e., pi = p,∀i ∈ {1, ..., k}.
Of course, even honest users can accidentally check-in to a HV. However,
these instances are not expected to be excessive. Therefore, a suspiciousness
level l(u), can be defined for every user u. l(u) can be a function h of many factors
such as the number of checkins to HVs q(u) of user u and the number of distinct
HVs r(u) that u has checked-in at3, that is, l(u) = h(q(u), r(u)). By defining a
threshold L, we can have the following decision rule for gamer cheaters:
l(u) > L⇒ u is flagged as cheater (5)
Identifying the optimal value for L is of course not trivial. A low value for
L can lead to many false positives (i.e., honest users flagged as cheaters), while
a large value for L can increase the detection time and/or increase the false
negatives (i.e., misbehaving users considered honest).
3 One can define more factors that contribute to the calculations of l(u).
Advanced response from cheaters: It should be evident, that if dis-
honest users become aware of this HV system, they can be more cautious with
their check-ins. Their goal should be to keep their suspiciousness level below
the threshold L. However, note here that, even if our scheme might not be able
to flag them as cheaters (e.g., l(u) < L), it will have significantly contained the
number of fake check-ins, since the only way for u to keep his suspiciousness level
low is by reducing his fake activity. This is true, given the fact that honeypot
venues look exactly like legitimate locales and hence, the ability of a cheater to
identify HVs is at best random.
It is clear from the above design and analysis of the HV scheme, that the
proposed system exhibits the following attractive characteristics:
– It does not require the cooperation of third parties (e.g., certification providers,
telecom providers etc.) and can be deployed and controled purely by the
LBSN provider.
– It is neither hardware dependent, not does it require special hardware at the
mobile devices of the end users. Hence, it is ideal for immediate deployment.
3.2 Challenge-Response for Monetary Cheaters
As aforementioned, monetary cheaters are mainly interested into venues with
special offers. This means that we should include in the set C one or more vari-
ables with regards to the special deals of the HV. For instance, the number
of special offers x and their type y (i.e., requiring multiple check-ins, majority
of check-ins etc.) are two staightforward candidates4. Consequently, honeypot
venues specifically tailored to this kind of cheaters should be designed by assign-
ing a much higher weight to the corresponding variables (e.g., x and y).
However, monetary cheaters are by default interested in real-world rewards.
Hence, they are expected to only consider establishments that they have visited
in real life or locales they are aware of and they would be interested in visiting. In
order to increase the efficiency of the HV scheme against this class of dishonest
users, we enhance it with a challenge-response mechanism.
In particular, every time Bob, attempts to check-in a venue ξ which offers
a special deal, a question relevant to the venue is asked, and he will have to
pick the answer from a given menu. The question is randomly selected from a
set of challenges vξ. Of course, this challenge should be relevant to both the
venue as well as the time of check-in. For instance, the application could ask for
the “special of the day” for the case of a restaurant. As it is evident, the load
of issuing the challenges should be distributed to the locale owners. The latter
should decide how often they change these challenges based on the tradeoff
between monetary loss and cost of seting up the detection scheme. Figure 3
depicts the challenge-response process.
While, relying on the venue owner can still leave an open door for fake check-
ins (e.g., locale owners do not change the challenges often, or they do not set them
4 Vector y is a 1 × s binary vector, where s is the number of different possible types
of offers. Element yi is 1 iff there is an offer of type i.
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Fig. 3. The challenge-response scheme for monetary cheaters.
up at all), recall that monetary fake check-ins represent a small only fraction
of the cheating behavior. Hence, the fake information present in the system is
expected to be small compared to its initial level after the deployment of both
HVs and challenge-response. This significantly icrease the value of the data,
since they are truthfull and can be reliable used for services and studies as
aforementioned.
On a more philosophical note, monetary cheating exhibits indirectly a pref-
erence signal of misbehaving user for specific venues. The thesis behind this
claim is that he would not be engaged into cheating if he did not have even
the slightest preference towards the specific locale. Therefore, the degradation
caused from monetary cheating in services such as recommendations might be
less as compared to the case of gaming fake check-ins5.
Evaluations
We would like to emphasize on the fact that we consciously did not perfom
evaluations of the proposed schemes. Thorough evaluations would require the
creation of a large number of honeypot venues. Equations (3) and (4) give the
overall probability of a cheater checking-in to a HV. Of course, the ultimate
probability of flagging a user as cheater depends on the function h and the
threshold L. However, it is evident that in order to maximize the probability that
a cheater check-ins to a HV, a large number of honeypot venues, comparable to
the number of real venues, might be required (λ≫ φ). For that, we did not want
to interfere with the operations of the LBSNs providers, who are able to have
perfect control over HVs, if they were to deploy them.
5 Of course, the thurthfulness of this statement heavily depends on the specific algo-
rithms used for recommendations.
In the near future we plan to collaborate with an LBSN provider in an effort
to examine the viability of the proposed scheme.
Discussion
While our work deals with the detection of cheating users with regards to the
generated check-ins, it is also important for the location-based service provider to
decide what measures it should take against them. It is not necessary that these
users are banned from the system. However, the latter can simply ignore the
data generated from them in any service that provides and requires input from
user generated data. Additionally, it can flag them as “fake”, for notifying third
parties that might utilize them to be cautious. In general, the policy followed
can differ for different systems and depends on the provider.
However, a more subtle issue arises if we consider the way that the system
should promote HVs to users. For example, if δ venues are presented to the user
who wants to check-in how many of those should be honeypots? In what order
are they presented? On the top of the list? Towards the bottom? Uniformly
interleaved? The answers to these questions might be customized to every user
u and be a function of l(u). Providing answers to these questions is outside the
scope of our work, but it is clearly an issue that needs to be carefully thought.
4 Conclusions
Applications that facilitate location information to provide a number of novel
services, have emerged during the last years. However, these applications have
mainly focused on providing users with an easy way to generate huge volumes
of data, mainly through the action of check-in. This has left the floor open
for misbehaving users to game the system and even overwhelm it with fake
geographical information. Filtering non truthful spatial information is hence, of
critical importance. In this paper, we propose a novel scheme for detecting fake
check-ins in location-based services. Our system is based on the primitives of
honeypots. As compared to other possible solutions (e.g., location proofs and
secure localization) it possesses the advantage that it can be solely deployed by
the location-based service provider without the need for - trusted - third party
entities.
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